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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Appellant (Mr. Smith) appeals to the Utah State Court of Appeals for a
Reversal from his conviction of Electronic Communication Harassment Domestic
Violence in The Fourth District Court in the State of Utah, American Fork Department.
The Utah State Court of Appeals has Jurisdiction over criminal cases from a court of
record pursuant to Utah Code 78A-4- 103(e).
Mr. Smith, regrets that he is not familiar enough with any particular case law within the ever expanding universe of case law - that would grant unbiased direction of
review relevant to this particular case. Mr. Smith, instead, pursuant to Utah State
Constitution, Article 1, Section 27, Respectfully defers and submits to the independent
reason, principle, logic, authority, and experience of this Honorable Court of Appeals, to
accurately apply, within its rulings, the principles of Truth and Accountability, while
respecting Individual Liberty above all else, in order to preserve the Honor and Integrity
of this very essential System of Justice. Mr. Smith also Respectfully requests that the
Honorable Court apply the same to the de novo standard of review in the following
Statement of Issues.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I. Whether or not Utah Code 76-9-201 is facially unconstitutionally overbroad and
unconstitutionally vague and abridges the Freedom of Speech in violation of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America.
IL Whether or not the appellant's complete, unabridged, personal and private cell phone
records were obtained and presented at trial, in spite of his objection (p. 72-73),
against his Fourth Amendment right to privacy.
III. Whether or not the prosecutor, by obtaining the appellant's complete and unabridged
cell phone records without a warrant, without a subpoena, and without the consent of
the appellant, violated The Appellant's Third Amendment Right to befreefrom
Agents employed by government to observe and record the contacts he makes with
others within his own Home.
IV. Whether or not the Defendant's Second Amendment Right to defend himself and his
family is now denied under Utah Code 77-36-l(4)(e) in combination with Utah Rules
for Criminal Procedure Rule 22(c)(2) , and also in violation of Utah State Const.
Article 1 Section 6.
V. Whether or not the Defendant's right to a Speedy Trial was denied to him, even after
he submitted a Motion for Speedy Trial (see Motion For Speedy Trial, p. 120, 10/
26/09), in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
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CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
USC, Const. Amendment I
USC, Const. Amendment II
USC, Const. Amendment III
USC, Const. Amendment IV
USC, Const. Amendment V
USC, Const. Amendment VI
USC, Const. Amendment XIV, Section 1
Utah State Const Article 1 Section 3
Utah State Const Article 1 Section 6
Utah State Const Article 1 Section 27
Utah Code 76-9-201
Utah Code 77-36-1

STATEMENT OF CASE

The Appellant, (Mr. Smith), and his ex-wife, (Mrs. Martinez), have been
divorced since January, 2003, and share Joint custody of two boys, presently ages 11 and
13, and at the time of the incident 8 and 10 (p. 68). Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, in
which Mr. Smith is the petitioner, "Any parental duties orrightsnot specifically address
in this plan shall be discussed and mutually decided by both parents. Should the parties
5

have a dispute regarding parenting of the children; the petitioner will make the final
decision (Exhibit 10) (p. 112)." For the first two years of this divorce, the relationship
was extremely cooperative andfriendly(p. 68 & 104-105). However, after several
incidences this divorce turned from amicable to acrimonious (p. 105).
Mrs. Martinez called in to American Fork City Police Department on January 8,
2008, to complain that she was receiving calls from her ex-husband and that he was
calling her names like whore, skank, and white trailer park trash (p. 69). Mr. Smith was
contacted by an officer Bullock and notified that he had received a complaint from his
ex-wife. Mr. Smith admitted that he had used those terms in the past, but in anger (p.
162). Mr. Bullock did not determine the reason for these calls (p 165-166). Mr. Smith
was advised to be 'civil', when communicating about the children (p. 162).
Mrs. Martinez complained to American Fork City Police on March 20, 2008,
that she was receiving text messages from Mr. Smith that were demeaning to her and to
her boyfriend (now husband) Daniel F. Martinez (p.95). Mrs. Martinez, submitted a text
message dated March 17, 2008, and several other handwritten and typed up text messages
(Exhibits 2-9) from Mr. Smith to American Fork City Police Department, and continued
to submit further copies of offensive messages while an investigation was conducted
upon Mr. Smith.
Nearly 11 months later, Mr. Smith sent a text message to Mrs. Martinez dated,
February 06, 2009, which emphatically expressed Mr. Smith's objections to his ex-wife
taking his children to her Mormon church, and warned her that he would file a Motion to
Show Cause if she continued to do so without first mutually discussing and addressing
6

his concerns {see Exhibit 21). One week later, on February 13, 2009, a memo was
prepared by Prosecutor Tucker Hanson to Officer Kogianes, stating that a warrant and
affidavit had been prepared for Mr. Smith's arrest {see Attorney's Affidavit as to Order
Compelling Discovery, Exhibit A, Memo dated February 13,2009, 03/08/2010). On
February 26, 2009, Mr. Smith was handcuffed, arrested, and charged for a violation on
March 17, 2008 of Electronic Communication Harassment Domestic Violence {see
Information and Attorney's Affidavit as to Order Compelling Discovery, Exhibit A,
Law Incident Table, Officer C. Paul, 03/08/2010)
During the course of this prosecution, Mr. Smith submitted several requests for
discovery information including requests for victim statements, all submitted text
messages, and investigation records. All of these requests were denied. It was not until
the day after the Defendant submitted his Motion for Speedy Trial {see Motion for
Speedy Trial 10/26/09), that the Prosecutor finally submitted, along with a Motion for
Continuance, a subpoena to T-Mobile requesting the cell phone records of Mrs. Martinez
pertaining to all phone calls and text messages sent and received between the Defendant's
and the alleged victim's cell phone numbers from the dates of March 17, 2008 and
October 1, 2009. {see Motion for Continuance and Subpoena Duces Tecum, dated
10/27/09).
The Defendant received a Supplemental Response to Discovery Request on
January 12, 2010, containing the full, complete, personal, and private cell phone records
of David Smith's cell phone number from the dates ofDecember 07, 2007 to April 08,
2008 (see Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery. 01/12/10\ These records
7

were never requested within the prosecutor's Subpoena Duces Tecum, and the dates of
records received are outside of the dates in this subpoena.
Mr. Smith never gave his consent to the prosecutor to obtain these records, and
was never notified by what means he was able to obtain them. As a result of these
records, the Information charging Mr. Smith was expanded to the dates of December 21,
2007 to March 18, 2008 (see Amended Information, 01/12/10).
Mr. Smith objected to the publication of his complete private records at trial, but
this was overruled (p. 72-73). Mr. Smith was convicted and then sentenced on August
31, 2010 for a violation of Electronic Communication Harassment Domestic Violence.
Mr. Smith respectfully appeals.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The Appellant, (Mr. Smith), and his ex-wife, (Mrs. Martinez), have been divorced
since January, 2003, and share Joint custody of two boys, presently ages 11 and
13, and at the time of the incident 8 and 10 (p. 68).
2. Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, in which Mr. Smith is the petitioner, "Any
parental duties or rights not specifically address in this plan shall be discussed and
mutually decided by both parents. Should the parties have a dispute regarding
parenting of the children; the petitioner will make the final decision (Exhibit 10)
(p. 112)."

3. Mr. Smith, as primary custodial parent, has an inherent as well as legal right,
obligation, and responsibility to communicate with his ex-wife regarding her
inappropriate behavior using whatever terms apply {self evident).
4. Mrs. Martinez presented several text messages at trial from Mr. Smith that employ
a surly tone and harsh vernacular {see Exhibits 2-9).
5. The factual nature of this harsh vernacular or any demeaning terms, as well as any
circumstances giving rise to them, was considered irrelevant at trial and therefore
taken out of context {see The entire cross and direct of Mrs. Martinez).
6. The purpose of, and subject matter within, each of the text message presented at
trial was either to respond to Mrs. Martinez' communications, to make prearrangements for mediation, or regarding the payment for care, or concerning the
welfare and upbringing of the children (see Exhibits 2-9).
7. Although Mrs. Martinez testified that she told Mr. Smith to stop sending her text
messages. Mrs. Martinez transmitted a text message stating "You always send me
5 page texts and I would rather have them that way. So no one gets confused about
what was actually said." And another text sent 9/15/08 stating "Im on break but im
going back so if you need something you need to leave a message or text." {see
Exhibit 14).
8. On or before March 17,2008, Mrs. Martinez called her son at daycare and invited
him to a birthday party on the 18th of that Month (p. 145).
9. Mr. Smith had custody of the children during the week of March 18th (p. 157).
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10. Mrs. Martinez did not make any effort to contact Mr. Smith regarding the party
invitation (p. 157).
11. Mrs. Martinez submitted to American Fork City a text message dated March 18,
2008 (Exhibit 9 ).
12. Mr. Smith submitted into evidence a text message dated March 18, 2008 with the
exact same date and time as Mrs. Martinez's handwritten exhibit, but containing
completely different text (Exhibit 20).
13. Mrs. Martinez complained to the Police on March 20th, 2008 with several
handwritten copies of texts, regarding their demeaning nature (p.95).
14. Mr. Smith submitted several requests for discovery information including requests
for victim statements, all submitted text messages, and investigation records {see
The Defendant's various motions for Discovery).
15. None of these discovery requests were adequately resolved {see Motion for an
Order to Compel Discovery and Answers to Bill of Particulars, 06/30/10).
16. Mr. Smith filed a Motion For Speedy Trial on October, 26, 2009 (see Motion for
Speedy Trial 10/26/09).
17. In spite of Mr. Smith's Motion, the trail date of November, 3, 2009, was cancelled
because this was in conflict with Election Day {see pretrial records, 10/../09).
18. The day after Mr. Smith filed his Motion for Speedy Trial, the prosecutor filed a
Motion for Continuance {see Motion for Continuance, 10/. 709)
19. The Prosecutor submitted, along with this Motion for Continuance, a subpoena to
T-Mobile requesting the cell phone records of Mrs. Martinez pertaining to all
10

phone calls and text messages sent and received between the Defendant's and the
alleged victim's cell phone numbers from the dates ofMarch 17, 2008 and
October 1, 2009. (see Motion for Continuance and Subpoena Duces Tecum,
dated 10/27/09).
20. The Defendant received a Supplemental Response to Discovery Request on
January 12, 2010, containing the full, complete, personal, and private cell phone
records of David Smith's cell phone number from the dates ofDecember 07, 2007
to April 08, 2008 (see Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery,
01/12/10).
21. These records were never requested within the prosecutor's Subpoena Duces
Tecum, and the dates of records received are outside of the dates in this subpoena
(compare request, results, and dates of Supplemental Response to Request for
Discovery, 01/12/10 and Subpoena Duces Tecum, dated 10/27/09).
22. Mr. Smith never gave his consent to the prosecutor to obtain these records, and
was never notified by what means he was able to obtain them. As a result of
these records, the Information charging Mr. Smith was expanded to the dates of
December 21, 2007 to March 18, 2008 (see Amended Information, 01/12/10).
23. Mr. Smith objected to the publication of his complete private records at trial, but
this was overruled (p. 72-73).
24. Mr. Smith was convicted and then sentenced on August 31, 2010 for a violation of
Electronic Communication Harassment Domestic Violence, (see Sentence,
Judgment Commitment 08/31/10).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Honorable Court of Appeals has considered and ruled upon Utah Code 769-201 in Provo City v. Whatcott and Provo City Corp. v. Thompson prior to 2004. Since
this time, in 2005, this statute has been modified by Representative Dougall from
American Fork District, who, instead of incorporating the rulings from Logan v. Huber
and Provo City v. Whatcott, has expanded the statute to restrict, stifle, and chill even
more protected speech, and has produced a statute which potentially criminalizes anyone
who even attempts to communicate by cell phone and by email; the most common forms
of remote communication today. Now nearly anyone can be put through the excruciating
process of a prosecution and trial just to defend the intent of their communication. The
end result of this is a severe chilling effect on intercommunication, leaving people
atomized and more controllable. This statute is not only unconstitutionally overbroad,
unconstitutionally vague, it is unnecessary in the face of technology that would prevent
the evils that this statute proscribes. This statute gives improper power to vindictive exwife's and jurisdictions of a majority religion or culture to maliciously punish others.
Mr. Smith has not just a reasonable, but required, expectation of privacy within
the aggregate of his complete personal private cell phone records. To prevent this
privacy is to stifle and chill intercommunication. A person's complete private cell phone
can be used to illegitimately gain a revealing profile of a person.
The prosecution obtained these records not by warrant, not by subpoena, but by
government spying through cell phone company agent within appellants Home, thereby
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violating his third amendment right Mr. Smith is quartering this government paid agent,
this Soldier, within his home by paying for the service by which he is being monitored.
Mr. Smith has been maliciously defamed as a perpetrator of Domestic Violence.
Mr. Smith has never so much as raised his hand in anger or malice towards a woman or a
child; in his opinion, a man who does so is not a man. As a result of this redefined term
'Domestic Violence', Mr. Smith has now been denied his Second Amendment right, and
his right, guaranteed by Article 1 Section 6 of the Utah State Constitution, to own a
reliable means of self defense. This deprivation is an unjust punishment for the crimes
that others have committed.
And Finally, The right to a speedy trial is an inherent and inalienable right that
prevents undue distress upon someone falsely charged of a crime. Such a person and his
family must live in worry and concern that he could be unjustly convicted of that crime,
and must live with the undue shame from that accusation, and live with the crippled
relationships that resultfromthat accusation. To take one and a half years to try a man
for sending demeaning text messages Is Cruel, and Malicious, and violates this
inalienable Right.
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ARGUMENT
A statute that criminalizes Speech based upon the intent of the communicator
abridges the Freedom of Speech, and violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constitution of the United States of America.
'"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, "it means
just what / chose it to mean - neither more nor less '"(Lewis Carol, 'Through the looking
Glass') Although, they've a temper, some of them, words are incapable of causing
physical harm; they are just vibrations of the air, or characters on a page. It is through the
images, thoughts, and ideas that words produce within the receiver's mind that any sort of
discomfort, or cognitive dissonance, can be caused. A person's perception and reaction
to certain words depends a great deal upon the person's individual personality, culture,
and experience with such words.
Regardless of a person's reaction to certain words, the criminalization of Speech
is the criminalization of Thought; and to make a law that abridges the Freedom of Speech
is to invite the most horrific forms of Abuse, Tyranny, and Dystopia within a society. To
be able to control the Thoughts of citizens, and to only allow those 'nice', 'inoffensive',
'un-intimidating' thoughts to occur within their minds, is a very effective method of
domesticating the public into a pusillanimous heard of sheep that can be fleeced, taxed,
and culled, as the Master chooses, while that blissful heard grazes in the pasture and
chews on the grass, only being alarmed by those who introduce thoughts that are not
allowed.
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The Founders of this Great Nation, and especially those who signed their names
to the Declaration of Independence, knew Ml well the abuses that resultfromthe power
to sentence to harsh punishment, and even to death, those who had the temerity to express
their own True and Ingenuous sentiments against the King or others in his favor. This
Nation was founded upon and with and by the Freedom of Speech, and a very many
Great Brave Men have sacrificed their own lives to defend this and other Freedoms.
More recent history has shown, through the mass murdering collectivist regimes
of Stalinist Russia, Nazi Germany, and Maoist China — all of which began their tyranny
with the suppression of speech and control of the press — that We the People have far,
far, far, more to fear from the unchecked and unaccountable power of our Own
Government thanfromthe most hateful and protective resource bearing nation opposed
to the U.S., the most deplorable and deranged mass murdering criminal, the most clever
and brutally effective terrorist, and even the most annoying, alarming, intimidating,
offensive, abusive, threatening, harassing,frightening,and disruptive text messager alive
on this planet.
James Madison, the Father of the Constitution, introduced the Freedom of
Speech clause to Congress by stating "The people shall not be deprived or abridged of
their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments {see Annals of Congress,
434(1789))." This clause was broadened in scope to state "Congress shall make no law
abridging the Freedom of Speech." To grant to government the power to criminalize
speech is to grant government the power to condemn, by deprivation of liberty and
property, those who only condemn verbally. This First Amendment restriction upon
15

Congress, and Fourteenth Amendment restriction upon the States, prevents the inevitable
abuses that would result from this power to criminalize speech, while not completely
restricting civil remedy for those who are improperly defamed and truly harmed by the
malicious speech of others.
This Electronic Communication Statute, by criminalizing the speech with a
particular intent, lessens in extent, and shortens by omission, the free communication of
others, and thereby, by definition, abridges the Freedom of Speech and violates the Law
proscribed by the First Amendment. The People shall befree,fromthe threat of criminal
charges, to express their True and Ingenuous sentiments regardless of the vernacular or
intent of their expression. To second guess, or call into question, under pain of criminal
punishment, the intent of a person's attempt to communicate has a severe chilling effect
on Speech and intercommunication. This statute must be overturned.

This Electronic Communication Harassment statute employs terms of intent that
are unconstitutionally vague and undefined in order to suppress the Freedom of Speech.
This Statute, obfuscated by sophistry, employs a long list of vague, undefined,
scary and harmful sounding words, some of them with tempers — such as to annoy,
alarm, intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten, harass,frightenand disrupt — to describe a
communication intent that is to be restricted by law under pain of criminal charges. All
of these listed intents are constitutionally protected. Regardless, the vagueness of this
statute leaves the public, as well as police officers, uncertain as to exactly what type of
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communication will result in criminal action against a person, and thereby severely chills
even the most innocuous attempts to communicate.
A real world example of the severe chilling effect of this statute and the
vagueness of its proscriptions comes from an actual discussion of whether or not to call
other members of a Toastmasters group a day before the meeting to remind them of their
assignments. It was decided that there could be criminal penalties for annoying
communications, and that to call and remind someone of their assignment could also be
seen as annoying or harassing someone into fulfilling their commitments, and so could
result in criminal actions if someone vindictive enough were to file a complaint.
The term 'alarm5, is extremely vague. A call from a neighbor with the intent to
'alarm' that neighbor that their house is on fire could result in criminal penalties of six
months in prison a several thousand dollars fine?
The term 'intimidate' is an unconstitutional restriction and unconstitutionally
vague. To contact a legislator advising him that he is violating his Oath of Office by
passing a certain piece of legislation, and by reminding him that there are penalties for
this, could be considered an intent to intimidate and could result in criminal charges.
The term 'offend' is unconstitutionally vague. Some people go out of their way
to be offended by any little thing; these people must be avoided at all cost. Contacting
your legislator to describe the piece of legislation that he just proposed, where the most
flattering term to describe such legislation would be 'piece of turd', could be deemed an
intent to offend, and result in criminal charges.
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The term 'abuse' is perhaps the most abused term in the English language; it has
been forced to mean so many different things whether they apply or not. What is abuse,
and whether the silent treatment is emotional abuse or not, can now be contested in this
society. If with the intent to emotionally abuse, a person does not answer his phone,
would this result in criminal charges?
The term 'threaten' is also vague. To send a text message stating that legal
action will be taken if you continue to take my boys to your church without first mutually
discussing and deciding my concerns first, can be seen as a threat Is such a statement a
criminal act?
The term 'harass' is vague. Again, to call and remind your fellow Toastmasters
of their assignments every week could be considered harassment and result in criminal
charges.
The term 'frighten' is also vague. A call to the neighbor with the intent to
frighten them regarding a situation where their child is playing too close to the very deep
canal could result in criminal charges?
The term 'disrupt' is unconstitutional and also vague. To leave a long winded
voice message on a recipients voice mail, therebyfillingit up, or a lengthy 5 page long
text message, as 'preferred' by your ex-wife, could result in criminal charges?
Each and every term presented in this statute presents a dilemma for Law
enforcement officers, as well as private citizens, regarding whether a particular
communication attempt, could potentially be seen as a criminal act. Therefore, this
statute must be ruled unconstitutionally vague by the Honorable Court.
18

The Appellant Mr. Smith, as primary custodial parent of his children, has an
inherent and inalienable right as well as the legal duty, obligation, and the responsibly to
verbally defend the integrity of his children, and to communicate with his ex wife to
express his disapproval of behavior that he finds is destructive to his children.
The Court of appeals found that in Provo v. Thompson the unwanted call
provision was not unconstitutionally overbroad because "there is no right to audibly
invade another's honle or place of business by telephone ring in an attempt to
commandeer her listening ear when she has affirmatively expressed a desire to be left
alone {Provo v. Thompson 2002 UT App 63 at f24).
First, in this case here, Mrs. Martinez neither lives nor works in American Fork
City, and therefore any complaint that her home or business was invaded by ringing
telephone cannot be addressed within the jurisdiction of American Fork.
Second, Mrs. Martinez is under contract, by Decree of Divorce, which she
agreed to and signed of her own free will, to mutually communicate with Mr. Smith
regarding the education, health, welfare, etc. of the children. And Mr. Smith has a
legitimate right to communicate with his ex-wife for those purposes and also to express
his concern for the welfare, safety, and integrity of his boys, regardless of any request to
not do so.
If Mrs. Martinez truly wished to have all offensive communications cease, then
she would have made efforts to cooperate with the mediation arrangements Mr. Smith
was trying to set up so that an intermediary form of communication could be negotiated,
instead of sending a text message stating "You always send me 5 page texts, in fact I
19

prefer them that way, that way no one gets confused about what was said", and then
playing the role of the Tar Baby, and then afterwards, setting up incidences, such as
calling the children at daycare to invite them to a birthday party during the other parents
care and custody time, and without first contacting the custodial parent to make sure that
this wouldn't interfere with his plans, and knowing full well that the invited child would
be severely disappointed with the custodial parent if he refused, and also knowing that
this would put the child into the precarious position of intermediary and messenger, and
also knowing full well that an angry and offensive and demeaning text message could
result from such an incident, and ultimately knowing that the angry and offensive
portions of this text message could be taken to the police, and could be used to have her
ex-husband charged, or worse - intrusively investigated - after she complained to them
that 'Oh my, I declare, I just don't know why my ex-husband is such a jerk and so rude
and demeaning towards me, I'm just an innocent church goer who couldn't do no harm, I
just want him to stop'

With or without a decree of divorce, and whether or not he has been requested or
informed to not contact the recipient, a concerned primary custodial father has the right to
contact the electronic communication device of his ex-wife:
1.

When the ex-wife has volunteered his son to a to a birthday party during the
fathers custody time, and without notifying the father, and the father needs to
know where his son is after finding he was not at daycare.
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2.

When he learnsfromhis children that they are being taught how to get 'free
stuff from Wal-Mart by his ex-wife's boyfriend, but they're not supposed to
tell - and then finds out that they then went back to the boyfriends place to play
with these 'free toys' while she and her boyfriend went back to his room to
have indiscreet sex such that the children, being concerned for their mother's
safety, walked in on the act.

3.

When he finds out that his children had spent a day at the Lagoon riding on rides
andridingon the lap of a complete stranger who his ex-wife had just met less
than two weeks before, and who turns out to have been accused twice of rape,
has a conviction of cohabitant abuse, and two violations of a protective order
among other things.

4.

When he has reason to believe that his ex-wife is abusing the daycare
arrangement, and causing him to pay for half of the cost of illegitimate
expenses, and also when he has reason to believe that the ex-wife is abusing
the children's child support payments.

5.

To get any homework assignments left at the ex-wife's home, at the end of the
school term, so that his child can pass the third grade.

6.

To make any arrangements or pre-arrangements for mediation.

7.

To discuss the education, religious upbringing, health and welfare of his minor
children.

8.

To discuss arrangements for vacations, and extraordinary custody time issues.
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9.

To respond to communication attempts from his ex-wife, including any response
to the repeated calls and text messages disrupting his own Christmas
celebrations with his children.
As a result of the unwanted calls provision of this statute, the Appellant, Mr.

Smith, his children, and his relationship with his children has been severely harmed. As a
result of this statute Mr. Smith was prevented from mutually discussing and deciding the
religious upbringing of his children regarding the incompatible beliefs of the LDS
religion and his own beliefs to his and his children's great detriment. And the list of
grievances go on and onfromhere.
There is an unwritten rule -as ancient as man — that states 'you do not watch
what goes on at another man's fire.' This is sage advice that keeps intertribal conflict to a
minimum. To interfere with and to offer unwarranted pity, support, validation, advice,
and perhaps even vengeance - without knowing, or even wanting to know, or without
even being entitled to know, the both sides of a conflict - almost always inevitably invites
irreparable disaster upon any relationship and especially the one side you are trying to
help.
American Fork City has stepped into a conflict where they do not have
jurisdiction, and has made zero effort to get both sides of this conflict, and in fact has
made a deliberate effort to avoid getting both sides of this conflict. American Fork City
must be at least re-advised by this Honorable Court.

22

The provision in this statute that criminalizes Speech, even after the person has
been requested or informed to not contact the recipient restricts, stifles and chills an
entire universe of constitutionally protected and legitimate communication.
A person has therightto initiate communication with another person when,
among other things, there is a legitimate family, social, or business issue at hand. In
addition to the rights of a parent to verbally defend the welfare of his children, there are
several other example categories of legitimate calls prohibited under this section of this
statute, even under the unwanted calls provision:
1. Calls from a mother to a young adult who has recently moved out of the family
home, and who calls toofrequently,even after being advised to not call, but is
overly concerned after not hearing from the young adult for an extended period of
time.
2. Calls from a neighbor, complaining to the owner of a dog who allows his dog to
run free throughout the neighborhood, and finds out again, that after repeated
complaints, and even after being informed to not ever call again, that owner's dog
continues to use his yard as a toilet.
3. Calls from a consumer wanting a refund from the producer of a product that falls
far from the advertised quality of that product, even after the producer of this
defective product advises the consumer to not call again.
4. Calls from a client to his lawyer requesting the status of his case and is instead
advised that he need not call again.
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5. Calls from a constituent to a legislator to protest the legislators stand on an issue,
even after he has been informed to not call again.

This statute not only sweeps within its ambit a wide variety of legitimate and
constitutionally protected speech, this statute completely disrupts and overrides any
attempts from those truly violated individuals who only seek a verbal resolution to their
conflict at hand. By criminalizing these attempts to communicate, individual conflict
resolution is prevented. Resentment builds and festers. And people are forced into the
last only recourse of legal resolution, which is prohibitively expensive for most, and
almost always ends unsatisfactorily for both.
This statute gives an incredible amount of power to vindictive ex-wives, to
charlatans, to the producers of defective products, and to the legislators who give away or
sell the Freedoms of their constituents. It gives these people the power to turn the tables
on those who even attempt to complain about improper action, and allows them to be
charged, tried, and potentially convicted to 6 months in prison, and several thousand
dollars fine.
This statute also gives an incredible amount of power to jurisdictions of major
religious influence to prosecute those cultures who do not use the vernacular of the
majority religious group, and who instead commonly uses an 'inappropriate and
unacceptable' vernacular as a matter of course. This case at hand is a perfect example of
these abuses of power that result from this Statute. Mr. Smith prays that this Honorable
court finds this entire statute overbroad and unconstitutional.
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This statute, instead of serving the People, oppresses the People, and serves the
cell phone corporations who profit from the enforcement of this harassment law, far more
than the most cell phone harassed victim.
With the progress of electronic communication technology, and especially with
the invention of the cell phone device, people have come to experience the great
convenience of being able to communicate with nearly anyone, nearly anywhere, and at
nearly any time. At the same time, however, people have come to experience the
inherent inconvenience of being able to communicate with nearly anyone, nearly
anywhere, and at nearly any time. This inherent inconvenience can be mitigated through
the ever evolving technological advances such as the power button, delete message
feature, ringer silence and vibrate, call forwarding, caller id, and even call number
blocking.
In fact, it is the responsibility of the cell phone owner to disable the device
during times when it is unwanted and inappropriate to receive calls - and it is Not the
fault of the caller to that owner, when there is a disruption of the peace within a Court
room, within a quiet theater, during quiet personal times, or even during religious
services by the ringing cell phone of a negligent owner of that cell phone device.
Sadly, there are those instances when a person is requested or informed to not
contact the recipient, and that person continues to do so. And while such requests should
be respected in the majority of circumstances, there are many diverse and constitutionally
protected times when it is legitimate to disregard such a request. Even in these cases, a
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recipient of unwanted communication could have the empowering technology of call
number blocking to eliminate unwanted communication.
This call number blocking technology has been available for some time and is
only available within certain calling plans. To take advantage of this technology would
be as simple and as easy as a service call to the telephone company service provider and - voila — no more unwanted callsfromthose psychotic ex-wives, and those jerk exhusbands, and all those telephone companies who have made it a point to call everyone in
America during dinner time to ask if they wanted to come back to their service. And all
of this without the cost and expense to the tax payer for the servicing of a criminal
complaint, a prosecution, a trial, and the expense of 6 months jail time to keep a cell
phone harassment offender. Unfortunately, this service is not providedfreelyby
telephone service providers, since to give this service away would be bad business and
would nullify a very lucrative supply of revenue from the phone records requests and
payments from law enforcement agencies to enforce these harassment laws.

The Legislation of this State can and should prohibit menacing and threatening
calls. However, the legislation of this State is bound by its own sacred Honor, by Oath
and Affirmation, to uphold, protect and defend the inherent and inalienable Rights
guaranteed by the Constitution, whether they personally agree with them or not. The
Legislation of this state has a greater duty to regulate the corporations who wish to do
business within this state, especially when this legislation goes to preserve the rights of
individual citizens.
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The Utah State Legislation has the power to require that phone service providers,
who wish to do business within this state, must offer to potential customers this call
number blocking service as requisite to conducting business in this state. It is interesting
to notice that Rep. John Dougall, from American Fork District — the author of this
recently changed statute, and who, as an electrical engineer, and who advertises himself
as one of the most technically capable legislators - has not even considered this
empowering technology, which would save taxpayers money, as a solution to stop
harassing phone calls. It is also interesting to notice that Mr. Dougall receives a vast
majority of his campaign contributions from "Communications and Electronics"
industries, and has received substantial contributions from AT&T, Verizon, and Comcast
{see FollowTheMoney.org, John Dougall UT, 2008).
This Statute of Electronic Communication Utah Code 76-9-201, is clearly
unconstitutional, oppresses the public, and was introduced for an invalid purpose. Mr.
Smith Prays that the Honorable Court will find this statute obsolete, anachronistic,
unnecessary, and Unconstitutional.

Mr. Smith's complete, unabridged personal and private cell phone records were
obtained and presented at trial, in violation of his Fourth Amendment right to privacy.
An individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy within the aggregate of his
complete personal private cell phone records. This expectation is not just reasonable it is
necessary to prevent the chilling effect on intercommunication and association. The
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aggregate of a person's phone records can reveal calls to particular types of medical care,
reveal a person's political affiliations, reveal the associations and relations of a person,
reveal embarrassing or improper, but not illegal conduct which could be used to
manipulate the person. A person's complete private cell phone record can be extremely
revealing and can be used to illegitimately gain an improper profile of a person.
The Prosecutor in this trial, by some means other than by Warrant particularly
describing the relevant records, and particularly describing the particular dates, was able
obtain the full and complete, personal and private, cell phone records of the Defendant
against the Defendant's Fourth Amendment right to privacy. And, by obtaining these
complete and private records, the Prosecutor was able to modify the Information charging
the Defendant to span a broader range of dates. And also,fromthe information within
this record, the prosecutor was able to determine that calling Mr. Martinez to the stand
would be detrimental to his case. And also, by hanging over the head of the Defendant
any potentially embarrassing records, the Prosecutor was given greater leverage to
attempt a lucrative plea bargain. Far, far, more egregious than that, the prosecutor has
publicly presented, at trial, these complete, unabridged, personal and private records,
which are above and beyond the scope of relevance in the given case, in spite of the
Defendant's objection, at trial, that these records were obtained against the Defendant's
Fourth Amendment right to privacy.
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The prosecutor, by obtaining the appellant's complete and unabridged cell phone
records without a warrant, without a subpoena, and without the consent of the appellant,
has violated The Appellant's Third Amendment Right to befreefromAgents employed
by government to observe and watch him, within his own Home.
The prosecutor in this case, by obtaining the complete, unabridged, personal, and
private cell phone records of the Appellant, without a Subpoena, without a Warrant, and
without Mr. Smith's consent, and through whatever cell phone company agent employed
by the prosecutor or some other government agency, has violated the Third Amendment
more so than the Fourth Amendment. Such a violation is at least as relevant, as
intrusive, as violating, as intimidating, and as deplorable as the quartering of Soldiers in
a person's Home, without the Owner's consent, to watch over the Owner's shoulder to
record every word typed on the computer, to watch and record every web page visited,
to listen in on every conversation whispered over the cell phone, and to also precisely
record the time date and duration of every contact made to others by the Owner of that
Home. The Founders of this Great Nation could have never predicted the technology
that would make such an intrusion by government into the personal Homes of Citizens
possible. It Is the very intent of these Brave and Brilliant Men, within this Third
Amendment, to prevent such violations and intrusions by government.
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Mr. Smith's Second Amendment Right to defend himself and his family is now
denied under Utah Code 77-36-l(4)(e) in combination with Utah Rules for Criminal
Procedure Rule 22(c)(2), and also in violation of Utah State Const. Article 1 Section 6.
It is a malicious defamation and an absurdity to accuse a man of Domestic
Violence for transmitting a demeaning text message to his e-wife. It is equally
demeaning to those victims of Domestic Violence who nearly diefromwhat is
commonly known as - but has now has been deceptively redefined - as Domestic
Violence. It is Orwellian to allow the Legislature to continuously redefine 'Domestic
Violence, and to arbitrarily add to the list certain offenders that can be categorized by this
term. For certain, the Legislation would not even be concerned about adding offenders to
this list of 'Domestic Violence5 violators if it weren't possible, through this classification,
to deprive a substantial and feisty portion of the population of their right to defend
themselves from a rogue government.
It is an unfair and unjust punishment to deprive a man - who has never owned
and has never misused afirearmfor an improper purpose - of his right to this reliable
means of self defense. To do so, is to unjustly punish that man for the crimes committed
by others. Mr. Smith prays that the Honorable Court find Utah Code 77-36- l(4)(e) and
Utah Rules for Criminal Procedure Rule 22(c)(2), an unconstitutional deprivation of
rights.
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Mr. Smith's right to a Speedy Trial was denied to himu even after he submitted a
Motion for Speedy Trial (see Motion For Speedy Trial p. 120, 10/ 26/09) , in violation of
the Sixth Amendment.
Mr. Smith clearly and emphatically objected to any proposed delay to the trial of
this case within his Motion for Speedy Trial. Still, this trial was cancelled due the trial
date of November 3, 2009, was in conflict with Election Day. The prosecutor was clearly
not prepared to go to trial, as evidenced by his Motion for continuance submitted the Day
after Mr. Smith's motion. By gaining a delay of this trial, the prosecutor was also
afforded the time to go on afishingexpedition into the ill gotten phone records of Mr.
Smith so that they could try Mr. Smith for an incident that might stick.
Therightto a speedy trial is an inherent and inalienable right that prevents
undue distress upon someone falsely charged of a crime. Such a person and his family
must live in worry and concern that he could be unjustly convicted of that crime, must
live with the undue shame from that accusation, and the destroyed and crippled
relationships that result. To take one and a half years to try a man for sending demeaning
text messages to his irresponsible and vindictive ex-wife Is Cruel, and Malicious, and
violates this inalienable Right.
Mr. Smith respectfully requests that the Honorable Court reverse his conviction
of Electronic Communication Harassment Domestic Violence with prejudice.
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CONCLUSION
Wherefore The Appellant, Mr. Smith, has shown that this statute of Electronic
Communication Harassment, Utah Code 76-9-201, is unconstitutionally overbroad and
unconstitutionally vague, and opens the door for all forms of malicious and jurisdictional
abuses, and is an unnecessary statute that serves the cell phone providers and oppresses
the people, and also abridges the Freedom of Speech as it restricts, stifles and chills
intercommunication;
And, Whereas, Mr. Smith has shown that the prosecution in this case has
violated his fourth amendment right to privacy and has published his, complete,
unabridged, personal, and private cell phone records at trial and against his objection that
these were unlawfully obtained;
And, Whereas, Mr. Smith has shown that the prosecutor, by obtaining Mr.
Smith's complete, personal, and private phone records, without a warrant, without a
subpoena, and without his consent, has violated Mr. Smith's Third Amendment Right to
befreefromAgents employed by government to observe and record the contacts he
makes with others within his own Home.
And, Whereas, Mr. Smith has shown that, Utah Code ... has improperly and
maliciously defamed him as a perpetrator of Domestic Violence, and that, along with
UCRP Rule 22(c)(2), has violated Mr. Smith's Second Amendment Right to a reliable
means of self defense;
And Whereas, Mr. Smith has shown that his right to a Speedy trial has been
violated to his great detriment;
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Mr. Smith Respectfully Prays that the Honorable Court will Reverse his
conviction of Electronic Communication Harassment Domestic Violence. And, Mr.
Smith Prays that the Honorable Court will rule to repair the Defects of Law in this case.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this

I€T4-

day of March, 2011.
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David Smith

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I mailed, by first class mail, to the office of the prosecutor a
true and accurate copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BREIF on this &**{
of March, 2011, to the following addresses:

American Fork City Prosecutor
Hansen, Wright, Eddy & Haws
233 South Pleasant Grove Blvd., Ste. 202
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062

\^J&
David Smith

33

JUZ3

day

ADDENDUM
Exhibit A
76-9-201. Electronic communication harassment — Definitions — Penalties.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Adult" means a person 18 years of age or older.
(b) "Electronic communication" means any communication by electronic, electromechanical, or electro-optical communication device for the transmission and reception
of audio, image, or text but does not include broadcast transmissions or similar
communications that are not targeted at any specific individual.
(c) "Electronic communication device" includes telephone, facsimile, electronic mail,
or pager.
(d) "Minor" means a person who is younger than 18 years of age.
(2) A person is guilty of electronic communication harassment and subject to
prosecution in the jurisdiction where the communication originated or was received if
with intent to annoy, alarm, intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten, harass, frighten, or disrupt
the electronic communications of another, the person:
(a) (i) makes repeated contact by means of electronic communications, whether or not
a conversation ensues; or
(ii) after the recipient has requested or informed the person not to contact the recipient,
and the person repeatedly or continuously:
(A) contacts the electronic communication device of the recipient; or
(B) causes an electronic communication device of the recipient to ring or to receive
other notification of attempted contact by means of electronic communication;
(b) makes contact by means of electronic communication and insults, taunts, or
challenges the recipient of the communication or any person at the receiving location in a
manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response;
(c) makes contact by means of electronic communication and threatens to inflict
injury, physical harm, or damage to any person or the property of any person; or
(d) causes disruption, jamming, or overload of an electronic communication system
through excessive message traffic or other means utihzing an electronic communication
device.
(3) (a) (i) Electronic communication harassment committed against an adult is a class
B misdemeanor, except under Subsection (3)(a)(ii).
(ii) A second or subsequent offense under Subsection (3)(a)(i) is a:
(A) class A misdemeanor if all prior violations of this section were committed against
adults; and
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(B) a third degree felony if any prior violation of this section was committed against a
minor.
(b) (i) Electronic communication harassment committed against a minor is a class A
misdemeanor, except under Subsection (3)(b)(ii).
(ii) A second or subsequent offense under Subsection (3)(b)(i) is a third degree felony,
regardless of whether any prior violation of this section was committed against a minor or
an adult.
(4) (a) Except under Subsection (4)(b), criminal prosecution under this section does
not affect an individual's right to bring a civil action for damages suffered as a result of
the commission of any of the offenses under this section.
(b) This section does not create any civil cause of action based on electronic
communications made for legitimate business purposes.
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Exhibits
77-36-1. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Cohabitant" has the same meaning as in Section 78B-7-102.
(2) "Department" means the Department of Public Safety.
(3) "Divorced" means an individual who has obtained a divorce under Title 30,
Chapter 3, Divorce.
(4) "Domestic violence" means any criminal offense involving violence or physical
harm or threat of violence or physical harm, or any attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to
commit a criminal offense involving violence or physical harm, when committed by one
cohabitant against another. "Domestic violence" also means commission or attempt to
commit, any of the following offenses by one cohabitant against another:
(a) aggravated assault, as described in Section 76-5-103;
(b) assault, as described in Section 76-5-102;
(c) criminal homicide, as described in Section 76-5-201;
(d) harassment, as described in Section 76-5-106;
(e) electronic communication harassment, as described in Section 76-9-201;
(f) kidnapping, child kidnapping, or aggravated kidnapping, as described in Sections
76-5-301, 76-5-301.1, and 76-5-302;
(g) mayhem, as described in Section 76-5-105;
(h) sexual offenses, as described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, Sexual Offenses, and
Title 76, Chapter 5a, Sexual Exploitation of Children;
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(i) stalking, as described in Section 76-5-106.5;
(j) unlawful detention, as described in Section 76-5-304;
(k) violation of a protective order or ex parte protective order, as described in Section
76-5-108;
(1) any offense against property described in Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1, Property
Destruction, Part 2, Burglary and Criminal Trespass, or Part 3, Robbery;
(m) possession of a deadly weapon with intent to assault, as described in Section 7610-507;
(n) discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, near a highway, or in the direction of any
person, building, or vehicle, as described in Section 76-10-508;
(o) disorderly conduct, as defined in Section 76-9-102, if a conviction of disorderly
conduct is the result of a plea agreement in which the defendant was originally charged
with any of the domestic violence offenses otherwise described in this Subsection (4).
Conviction of disorderly conduct as a domestic violence offense, in the manner described
in this Subsection (4)(o), does not constitute a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence
under 18 U.S.C. Section 921, and is exempt from the provisions of the federal Firearms
Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 921 et seq.; or
(p) child abuse as described in Section 76-5-109.1.
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment.
(c)(2) If the defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as
defined in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the court shall advise the defendant orally or in
writing that, as a result of the conviction, it is unlawful for the defendant to possess,
receive or transport any firearm or ammunition. The failure to advise does not render the
plea invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of the plea.
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